Tuesday 14:49
SCOTTISH TRAFFIC AREA
DECISION OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER
ARRIVA SCOTLAND WEST LIMITED - PM 1725
PUBLIC INQUIRY HELD AT EDINBURGH ON 18 FEBRUARY 2008
Background
1. Arriva Scotland West Limited holds a standard national public service vehicle operator licence and has done so since 1991. Current authority is for 275 vehicles with 250 discs in issue. They operate from depots in Inchinnan and Johnstone. The operator was at Public Inquiry on 29 June 2005 and 28 February 2006 when I decreased the number of vehicles authorised. The operator is engaged in local registered service work. Following my receiving adverse reports from a VOSA Vehicle Examiner and VOSA Bus Compliance Officers I directed that the operator be called again to Public Inquiry.
Public Inquiry
2. The Public Inquiry was held at Edinburgh on 18 February 2008. Mr Ralph Roberts, Managing Director, was present and gave evidence for the operator. Mr A Banks, Solicitor, Bath represented the operator. I record here that Mr Mike Cooper of Arriva was also in attendance. I appreciate very much when senior members of an operator Group attend at such Inquiries for Group decisions impact on local performance. Other officials from Arriva included Ms N Morrison and Messrs J Jackson, T Neil, C Campbell, M Rogers, J Cameron, A McDougal, and Mr John Greaves, Engineering Director. Mrs C Riley and Messrs Gray and McKellar, Bus Compliance Officers ("BCOs"), and Mr K McDonald, Vehicle Examiner represented VOSA.
3. Financial standing was satisfied.
4. The current Directors were advised as Mr Ralph Roberts and Mr Richard Boller (based in Luton) and Ms Liz Thorpe is Company Secretary.
5. As a preliminary matter Mr Banks took issue with the manner in which the non performance % of frequent services had been calculated by the BCOs and he referred me to the Senior Traffic Commissioner Practice Direction and also to the Department for Transport website. His calculations brought out a significantly lower figure.
6. The operator had lodged a bundle of productions and further items were lodged during the Inquiry. I record that in coming to my decision I have read the productions and taken them into account. Similarly I have had regard to all matters in the Public Inquiry brief of papers. There was one addendum to that brief which was from the Vehicle Examiner and which concerned 3 further prohibitions.
Vehicle Examiner evidence
7. There have been 10 (6 immediate and 4 delayed) prohibitions issued since the Public Inquiry of February 2006. One was "S" marked being that of 15 June 2007 for a wheel loss incident - photographs were available and showed one of the operator's vehicles straddled across a road junction having lost a wheel. Details of the immediate prohibitions were set out in the Examiner's report and ranged from a road spring main leaf fracture; passenger communication device inoperative (x2); seriously under inflated tyre and tyre off the wheel rim and shock absorber mounting fractured and detachment imminent; interior floor weakened and holed; and the wheel loss incident. A maintenance investigation of 30 June 2007 was marked as unsatisfactory due to the prohibitions, the main concern of the investigation being the wheel loss incident and concerns arising therefrom. The operator's annual test pass rate is very much higher than average.
8. The wheel loss incident took place on 14 June 2007 and the vehicle was examined by VOSA the next day when the prohibition was issued and narrated that the nearside outer axle 2 outer wheel detached, wheel studs bent and spigot badly worn. The Examiner's view was that the defect would have been detected if a meaningful first use check had been made. There was correspondence between VOSA and the operator, the latter's substantive response being that of 10 July 2007. That letter set out the findings from the operator's investigation and also that procedures had been reviewed. The operator did not blame the driver who was driving at the time of the incident as he was the fourth of that day and the changeovers had been in an urban setting.
9. In cross-examination the Examiner agreed that road spring fractures would be difficult for a driver to pick up. The passenger communication device prohibitions were imposed as the driver was in a self contained compartment. The shock absorber mounting fracture would not have been detectable by a driver. In making the S marking on the 15 June wheel loss prohibition the Examiner had made a judgment on the evidence before him. He did not consider that the particular bus journey of Paisley to Largs would have caused the detachment. He referred to the photographs and pointed out that wheels do not come loose on their own and that there would be signs for the driver to see. If a wheel comes off it is because it was not tight enough on at the start of the journey and the reason for the hub design was so that wheels would not come off during a journey. The Examiner accepted that the operator acknowledged that the wheel loss should not have happened and that the operator has tried to find out what had happened to avoid repetition
BCO evidence
10. On 19,25,26,28 September and 1, 2,9,10, 11,12,15,16, 17, 18, 22 and 25 October BCOs monitored the operator's local registered services PM1725/74 and 11 in the Paisley area. Registration /74 operated daily from Glasgow Airport to Foxbar as the number 60 on a varied frequency until between 9.05 and 16.13 when it becomes a 10 minute frequency. The BCOs expected to see 115 journeys and monitored on 20 instances of 60minute blocks, 7 of which failed to have the required 6 buses. Of 114 gaps measured there were 10 of more than 15 minutes which the BCOs equated to an unsatisfactory provision of 14% (all as set out in schedules to their reports).
11. Registration /11 operates as the operator's number 20 Monday to Saturday from Paisley Gallowhill to Johnstone Spateston on a varied frequency. The total number of journeys monitored was 111 of which 11 were out of the Traffic Commissioner's tolerances (1minute early/5 minutes late) and 4 failed to operate and which was calculated to be an unsatisfactory level of 13% (but one of the 4 ie for 30 October was a BCO error and so it should be 3).
12. Aggregating the monitoring to give 226 journeys they considered there to be unsatisfactory provision of 14%. The operator was invited to comment and did so by letter of 14 November 2007. In that letter the Arriva Service Quality Manager largely agreed with the figures. He commented that the 60 (/74) had been causing them reliability problems given the volume of passengers who also had luggage. Thus a variation had been made to the service as from 22 October to eliminate the airport and this had given added running time. Their service 66 which has larger capacity low floor vehicles had been extended to the airport.
13. For the 20 (/11) he accepted that early running was totally unacceptable and that drivers had been spoken to. He accepted that the 12.34 journeys on 1 and 2 October had failed to operate due to staffing problems and that where journeys are missed due to breakdowns etc every effort should be made to make sure that did not happen two days in a row. He took issue with a finding in relation to 30 October (the BCO accepted this point) and whilst he did think the 10:29 had operated on 25 October he could not prove it as a new driver had not operated the Wayfarer machine properly. Late running was blamed on traffic.
14. The BCO in cross examination explained that her method of calculating for frequent services was to add on 10 minutes and 11/4. At the side of the road they were looking for 6 buses to come. It was put to her that on 19 September that the 13.30 was there but left at 13.33 to which she could not say. She was aware that a variation application had been made. For the route 20 there had been a typing error which she had taken out and so there were only 3 and not 4 which failed to operate ie the 12.34 on 1 and 2 October and the 10.29. That would have to be factored into the percentages.
15. It was put to the BCO Mrs Riley that over 17 days and 226 journeys there was the possibility of error re the first vehicle at a timing point. Her response was that they corroborate each other's work and it is typed into schedules which their manager checks.
Evidence for the operator
16. I record here that in the bundle of productions for the operator there was extensive information on the individual prohibitions including the wheel loss incident; on maintenance procedures and daily driving checks, on the annual test history; the breakdown record and missing mileage record. I had specifically asked the operator to produce this information given the previous Public Inquiries at which I had discussed these aspects of the operator's performance. I was also given driver training material and the employee's handbook. That I do not mention all of these expressly or by reference to their contents does not mean I have not had regard to them simply that it would make for a very, very long decision if I was to rehearse all of the productions.
17. Mr Roberts was the sole witness for the operator and his written statement was in the productions and he read it to the Inquiry. His arrival at Arriva West in November 2007 post dated the matters giving rise to the call to Public Inquiry. He is taking over the role of Transport Manager from Mr Greaves. I will not rehearse his statement which narrates the organisational and operational measures in place within Arriva West. Much of his evidence was to give me the context to the matters of concern and to produce documentation in support. They are now keeping a log of bus delays. They are committed to driver training including and emphasising punctuality and reliability and the unacceptability of early running. They reckon to operate at between 88-90% punctuality but face problems of vehicle unreliability and driver shortage. They had to dismiss an underperforming Depot Engineer and found replacing him difficult. They also lost a Depot Foreman and the Operations Engineer left in July 2007 though he was replaced immediately. Thus in 2007 there was a lack of engineering management continuity at Inchinnan and additional management problems at senior level. His analysis of the wheel loss incident of June 2007 is that the factors leading up to the detachment would have been avoided had Arrival wheel fitment policy been followed. He will increase manpower to broaden the focus in maintenance from safety across to reliability to reduced breakdowns in service.
18. In relation to bus compliance they do employ four inspectors who do about 20 hours per month on monitoring. By the end of March 2008 he hoped they would have real time satellite tracking in place. They also get reports from drivers on problems on routes. They are in contact with councils re road works.
19. He did not accept VOSA's approach to the calculations of their operation. He took issue with their findings for 19 September when Wayfarer ticketing showed a departure at 13.33 with tickets being issued at 13.30 at Glasgow Airport. He was disappointed this service was monitored as a variation had already been lodged to meet problems they had identified. It was a service which was varied in June 2006 and was successful to June 2007 when terrorists struck at the Airport and increased security measures added to running times in and out of the airport. Passengers with luggage also caused delays and unpredictability to running time. Thus they decided to remove the airport from the service and the variation effecting that came in on 22 October. Larger buses could not have been put on the service due to the road layout at the Royal Alexandra.
20. He said he did not accept all of VOSA's findings for the route 20 (but he did not substantiate that.). In relation to the service failures on 1 and 2 October these were due to a shop steward attending disciplinary hearings and this was wrongly permitted. The 10.29 on 25 October did operate but they did not have the ticket evidence to demonstrate that but could point to the vehicle being P529 UGA which showed up in observations. However it appears that following additional running time having been put into this service that drivers have been running early on occasion.
21. He spoke to the statistics on lost mileage and the engineering difficulties were reflected therein with dips in lost mileage being countered by breakdowns and also by driver shortages which also contributed to lost mileage. He also had to admit that there were still instances of vehicles running out of fuel due to the vehicle's allocation for the day changing. Staff recruitment was difficult given the number of other operators in the area for although Arriva's conditions of service were better in relation to pensions and other benefits, many individuals preferred cash.
Submissions for the operator
22. The operator also produced its recalculation of the route 60 (/74) compliance statistics having regard to the Department for Transport Technical Guidance on monitoring the LTP2 mandatory indicators. The operator used the BCO timings and found a total average waiting time of 107.04 which it divided by the number of observations (17) to reach a global average waiting time of 6.30 which as a percentage in excess of AWT was 0.8% which the operator considered to be statistically insignificant. The operator also considered that for routes 60 and 20 they had reasonable excuse. The 60 had been affected by the airport and the delays in getting in and out following the terrorist incident. The variation application was made before the monitoring exercise happened. The operator had thus reviewed the registration and had monitored delays and taken steps. Action was taken and the e mail from Renfrewshire Council showed that the difficulties in Renfrewshire were under constant review. Drivers had been disciplined for early running. Steps had been taken to recruit drivers and within the productions there was evidence of recruitment measures. The operator had been fulfilling its obligations and had control strategies.
23. On maintenance this was a large fleet. Most of the prohibitions were not for first use failings and the prohibited items would have been dealt with at the next safety inspection. The annual test rate is very good and they have in place and are enhancing auditing of what they do. VOSA had not criticised the maintenance systems. The company was not complacent about the wheel loss incident and the fitters have all been trained in relation to wheel fitment. The company had done all that could be expected of them. The breakdown and lost mileage figures were matters Mr Roberts was addressing and there was confidence that through ownership of the problem that would bear fruit.
Consideration of the evidence and my decision
24. The regulatory regime - the 1981 and 1985 Acts themselves and as reflected in the licence undertakings - are there to ensure that bus operation is safe and reliable and that bus services once registered run to timetable and to route. Several times in this Inquiry I became concerned about complacency in the approach of the operator, through its agent, in that there appeared more of a pre-occupation with excuses rather than with the problem the passenger has at the bus stop when the bus does not come or there is the uncertainty over whether it will come or not or indeed whether it has gone already (a live consideration in this case)..
25. Turning first to the maintenance side of this case, I like to remind myself that between the two Public Inquiries of 2005 and 2006 the deferment thereby engineered served to lever this operator to a level of annual test success that was what I look for in a reputable compliant operator. This operator has managed to sustain that high pass rate at annual test. It has struggled improve its breakdown and lost mileage figures - as disclosed in the productions - and it is good that Mr Roberts has put that high on his professional agenda in his new role for bus breakdowns so far from home depots can mean real inconvenience and genuine upset for passengers. I remind myself that in the previous cases wheel issues also featured and it is vexing that this operator has had a wheel loss incident which should and could have been avoided - for that is what I take from the operator's own evidence and investigation for this operator does not seek to hide behind the discredited adage of the industry that wheel loss is a mystery. The operator's maintenance systems failed and hence the wheel loss. I believe that the operator has taken the incident very seriously and has reviewed its procedures. I am concerned at the number of prohibitions but I balance that against there being only one S marked and the annual test pass rate - noting also that for the minority of times when there was a fail it was not for multiple items in contrast to many other operator's performance. The wheel loss incident goes to road safety as well as reliability. All bus breakdowns go to reliability and will also impact on road congestion and the journeys of other road users so it is a critical message for the maintenance teams and the schedulers (in relation to fuel) that a well maintained checked bus is what the passenger needs.
26. Turning now to the BCO case, the starting points in any of these cases has to be the actual registrations. In Scotland the law in relation to these is found in section 6 of the Transport Act 1985 which gives the power to make regulations and those currently in force are the Public Service Vehicles (Registration of Local Services)(Scotland) Regulations 2001. Regulation 5 provides that the prescribed particulars of a service registered under section 6 of the 1985 Act are those specified in Schedule 1 to the Regulations as are relevant to that service. For the instant case the paragraph of the Schedule which is of interest is paragraph 10 which provides "A timetable for the service, indicating the days in the year when the service will be provided and the proposed times of individual services at principal points on the route, save when the service interval is 10 minutes or less when a statement of that fact may be given." (emphasis added)
27. In the current case neither of the services was registered as a 10 minutes or less service (commonly referred to as a "frequent service"). Rather perusal of the registration particulars for service 60 reveals it to be an entirely timetabled service albeit that in the middle of the day the time between buses is 10 minutes but at fixed times of the hour. Thus the buses were due to depart Glasgow airport at 03, 23,33,43,53 minutes past the hour. Now here I have to observe that the BCOs monitored in a hybrid fashion when it came to these parts of the operator's timetables. Neither did they present their findings by reference to the time when the bus was due nor did they take the approach which is favoured by the DfT technical guidance. Their approach has its merits in highlighting the actual waiting time between buses and in identifying if buses actually operated in the hour. Also I have to observe that in relation to service 60 they monitored the journey from Central Road in the direction of Glasgow Airport whereas Central Road is not a timing point for that journey. It is a timing point for the journey in the direction of Foxbar. Thus I am going to discount all observations of service 60 direction Foxbar to Glasgow Airport at Central Road, Paisley.
28. I have painstakingly gone over all of the BCOs observations and have set their findings against the registered particulars ie I have backfilled into their tables the actual scheduled times for the services - as per the timetables. I have also paid careful attention to the approach favoured by Mr Banks but I am unhappy that his approach does not deal adequately with failures to operate. I have drilled down to see what patterns are discernible and what can be gleaned for the failure to run to the timetable registered by the operator.
29. The following refers to service 60 only. For 19 September I find that there were services due at 12.33, 12.44, 12.53, 13.03, 13.13 and 13.23 and that apart from at 12.33 all the services operated within the TC tolerance. Thus there either was a failure to operate the 12.33 or it ran over 3 minutes early and so was not seen. 6 observations - 1 failed to operate. (monitored at the starting point of the airport).
30. For 19 September and monitoring at Central Road - 7 observations and only one outwith the tolerance ie the 11.54 ran 2 minutes early. 7 observations - 1 early running.
31. For 25 September - 6 observations at Central Road and five in order but the 11.06 did not operate 6 observations - 1 failed to operate.
32. For 26 September - 6 observations at Central Road and two 2 minutes early and the others within tolerance. 6 observations - 2 running early by 2 minutes
33. For 28 September - 6 observations at Central Road - 3 of these with 3 minutes and 2 minutes early, 2 within tolerance and one service missing ie 10.36 not seen but as monitoring began at 10.35 it could have run early within the tolerance so I will discount it. 5 observations - 3 early running
34. For 1 October at Central Road and again on 2 October there is the greatest divergence between the timetable and actual showing. On each day there is a no show at 13.16 and 2 buses run early by 3 minutes and two come at 13.53 together. It is impossible to know what is early and what late given that the monitoring was for a scant hour but whatever the timetable has been breached. On the 2nd there is 7 minutes late running and then 2 early runnings as well. Of 10 observations - only 2 compliant, the others are 2 late, 4 early and 2 inconclusive.
35. For 10 October at Central Road of 13 observations only 2 are within tolerance and all others are 2,3, or 4 minutes early. For 11 October of 7 observations 3 are early by between 2 and 5 minutes. Of course as vehicles start to run early so the waiting time for the passenger who goes out other than at the exact minute of departure is affected and hence the statistical calculations for the purpose of measuring punctuality on excess waiting time which I was pressed to follow in preference to the BCOs' hybrid approach. However I regard the 60 as a timetabled service and of the 60 observations I am taking into account, 30 were non compliant. However I pause here to acknowledge that the inconvenience and distress caused to a passenger by the non compliance of a 10 minute service is much less than say if a 30 minute service does not run but the very attractions of such a service to the travelling public is that the service should be spread out at short intervals during an hour. Thus whilst I am not in this case persuaded that I must follow the excess waiting time guidance I can see that not only might there be less passenger distress, but that if the operator is operating 6 or more to the hour that volume and the short gap between services allowing for the tolerances, which the real world requires, then it could be draconian to apply the same strictures to such a service as distinct from one timetabled to greater intervals.
36. The service 20 is a half hourly service and of 111 observations made, the BCOs found 3 instances of failing to operate, 9 early runnings and 2 running late ie 12% non compliance.
37. It is apparent that this operator has problems with early runnings and that goes against say congestion being the excuse for failing to operate to the particulars. Early running helps no one and I have noted that the operator will emphasise this in training. This case probably has more early runnings in it that most I deal with and I hope the operator, its drivers and their representatives will take heed of this and for the need to get it right. A bus that comes early is no use. It is clear that in October something had gone wrong with the 60. Curiously the September observations of this service were much better than those of October with there being a really noticeable deterioration in the timeliness of the service as the date for the variation came close. I give credit to the operator for having realised the need for the variation. I was surprised at how little monitoring the operator did of its services and I am pleased that it is introducing satellite tracking.
38. The operator admits the failings on 1 and 2 October for the service 20 and I record that I take the dimmest view of the operator causing/allowing a shop steward to leave his driving job to attend to a disciplinary hearing. This is a half hour service and on two days running the 12.34 simply and knowingly did not run. I regard the decision to remove the driver from his duties and not replace him to be contemptuous of the needs of passengers and of the reliance passengers place on the confidence to travel. I am really surprised that an operator of Arriva's stature thought that was a decision which could be taken. If nothing else comes from my calling the operator to Public Inquiry I hope it is this: that it cascades through the organisation that the passenger is the priority.
39. In relation to the wheel loss incident I find that the operator is in breach of the licence undertaking in relation to roadworthiness. I balance against that that the operator is achieving a high pass rate at annual test and that this was the only S marked prohibition. The operator candidly told me of recent difficulties in the engineering establishment and I thank it for that. It is Mr Roberts' priority and ambition to reduce the lost mileage figures and to keep the losses down. I am satisfied that the operator is serious in this regard. I shall put a condition on the licence keeping the operator to the current level of authorisation of 275 vehicles thereby reinstating the restriction I imposed on the operator in 2006 (and which the operator thus far has not sought to change). This means no expansion of authorisation for Mr Roberts' operation until he can persuade me he has achieved his aims. It will be for the operator to apply to me to remove this condition and if the annual test, prohibition history and evidence about lost mileage are satisfactory there is no reason to suppose I will not lift it.
40. In relation to the bus compliance matters, clearly the operator has not performed as well as it should have done and that staff recruitment, standards monitoring, and attention to the primacy of achieving punctuality and reliability have not been as sharp as I would expect from an operator such as Arriva. I have to have regard to the Practice Direction but I am not its slave and thus I can look at the operator in the round. This is not the worst case of non compliance I have dealt with by any means and for the 20 the non compliance is at 12%. I do not think it would be equitable to use a 50% figure for the 60 or to aggregate them. A 12% non compliance figure puts the operator into the band of £150 to £250 and this is a 275 vehicle authorisation. The penalty under section 39 of the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 will be 275 x £150 =£41,250. The penalty is payable to Scottish Ministers and must be paid by 30 April 2008.
41. I make no other orders as I am satisfied by Mr Roberts' assurances and Mr Cooper's presence at the Public Inquiry that I do not need to go as far as imposing any condition under section 26 in relation to local service registrations.
Summary of the decision
1. The licence is varied to include a condition limiting the number of vehicles authorised to 275.
2. The operator is ordered to pay £41,250 to Scottish Ministers by 30 April 2008.
Joan N Aitken SSC Traffic Commissioner for Scotland 25 March 2008
Client ref SCO/059/08
COI ref 159654P
